Subchapter S, An Entrepreneurial Survival Strategy for Small Banks by Craig, Steven G. & Hardee, Polly T.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 7
Issue 3 Fall 2002 Article 5
December 2002
Subchapter S, An Entrepreneurial Survival Strategy
for Small Banks
Steven G. Craig
University of Houston
Polly T. Hardee
University of Houston
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Craig, Steven G. and Hardee, Polly T. (2002) "Subchapter S, An Entrepreneurial Survival Strategy for Small Banks," Journal of
Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures: Vol. 7: Iss. 3, pp. 53-60.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol7/iss3/5
  
Subchapter S, An Entrepreneurial 
Survival Strategy for Small Banks 
 
 
 
Steven G. Craig* 
 
and 
 
Polly T. Hardee** 
 
 
 
 
With the passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, many small banks throughout 
the United States became eligible to reorganize as a Subchapter S corporation.  This allows these 
banks to eliminate double taxation, and increase shareholder value. Consequently, employing this 
entrepreneurial survival tool extends “new life” to the small bank.  Accompanying this strategy are 
differences in corporate governance, primarily more concentration of ownership.  Thus, this paper 
examines the behavior of  Subchapter S banks as compared to banks of similar size in order to 
determine significant performance differences.  It also focuses on bank structure and small business 
lending activity, an area of high asset concentration in small banks.  Overall, we find shareholder 
value appears to increase in a Subchapter S banking organization through higher earnings, larger 
dividend payout ratios, and similar risk measures.  We find little differences in these banks in 
relation to small business lending.  The implications are that a small bank’s survival rate will be 
higher in the consolidation process by employing the Subchapter S strategy. 
 
                                                          
*  Steven Craig received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, and has worked in a variety of applied 
microeconomic topics concerned with public policy, public sector behavior, and urban economic growth.  Much of 
his work has policy implications, and has appeared in public policy outlets as well as prestigious academic journals.  
The empirical work has utilized a wide variety of data sets, including large survey data sources.  Dr. Craig has been a 
Professor of Economics at the University of Houston since 1981, where he is currently Co-Director of the Institute 
for the Study of Political Economy.   
**  Polly Hardee received her Ph.D. from the University of Houston in 1997, after a successful career in the banking 
industry working for independent banks.  She has worked as an adjunct professor in the Department of Economics, 
teaching Money and Banking as well as International Monetary Policy Analysis.  Dr. Hardee’s research interests are 
in the area of banking and its effects on the economy, and especially small businesses.  She is currently working on 
the small firm behavior using a national survey of small firms as well as a national banking and bank holding 
company data set.   
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Introduction 
Passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 was one of the few times a piece of 
legislation actually accomplished what its title implied--i.e., it protected or preserved the jobs of 
community bankers in the bank consolidation process.  Through entrepreneurial loop-hole mining of 
the law,  these bankers realized they could exploit an opportunity that would increase the likelihood 
of survival, in an otherwise rather dismal outlook for many small banks.  The sponsors of this Act, as 
an unintended consequence, allowed small banks throughout the United States to become eligible to 
reorganize as a Subchapter S corporation.  This created value for the banks’ owners by avoiding 
double taxation of earnings, thereby making ownership of the small bank more lucrative relative to 
the alternative of merger into a larger financial institution.  Thus, it slowed the consolidation process. 
In a Subchapter S reorganization the shareholders are limited partners for tax purposes, and 
the bank or bank holding company is the general partner.  Although the legal liability of the owners 
remains the same, the tax status changes greatly.  In effect, the pretax corporate earnings are 
allocated to the owners according to their pro-rata share, with these earnings taxed at the individual 
level only.  This allows these banks to eliminate the taxation of  earnings at both the firm level via 
corporate rates, and the individual level via marginal rates on bank dividends.  Therefore, in a 
Subchapter S bank, what was previously paid in bank taxes, is now eligible to be distributed to 
owners, thereby increasing shareholder pre-tax cash receipts. Thus, if funds a bank previously paid in 
taxes are now distributed to the owners, and the shareholder’s allocated portion of corporate taxable 
earnings is less or equal to the cash distributions received, shareholder value is unambiguously 
increased.
1
  That is, greater after tax “dividends” result. 
In order to qualify for a Subchapter S bank, no more than 75 shareholders are allowed.  
Consequently, small banks with many shareholders need shareholder approval to convert, and with 
that approval require shareholders in excess of 75 to relinquish their shares.
2
  This can be an arduous 
process.  However, for financial institutions that did effectively reorganize their ownership structure 
to meet the Subchapter S criteria, “new life” was extended to the small bank.  Previous to the Act, 
many small banks were being consolidated into larger banking organizations in order to exploit 
economies of scale.   Accordingly, many banks converted to this new type of ownership, rather than 
merging into a larger organization or exiting the industry (Harvey and Padget, 2000).  As of June 
2000 over 18% of small banks were classed as Subchapter S.   
Small banks, due to capital and local market constraints devote higher percentages of  their 
commercial lending portfolios to small businesses (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1998).  Prior research has shown they have a comparative advantage in that market 
(Craig and Hardee, 2000, 2001; Keeton, 1996, 1995).  This raises the question, “Does this new type 
of structure, with more concentrated ownership, result in significant behavioral differences in these 
community banks, particularly in relation to small business lending?   This question becomes even 
                                                          
1
  Subchapter S banks may limit its distributions to less than its taxable income.  If the bank has grown, it may have 
to retain some taxable earnings to build capital.  That is, the owner is taxed on earnings of the bank for which he did 
not receive a distribution.   Thus it is possible that a shareholder can be taxed on bank earnings without receiving 
commensurate distributions, resulting in lower after tax returns than prior to the Subchapter S conversion. Although 
this is unlikely, (since it destroys the incentive to convert structures), the equality of taxable income to distributions 
received eliminates the ambiguity. 
2
  Legislation is pending to increase that number to 150 shareholders (Harvey and Padget, 2000). 
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more germane, considering the concern that small firms, a major engine of growth for the U.S. 
economy, will continue to have adequate access to credit as the banking sector progresses through its 
consolidation process (Berger & Udell, 1995).  Since theory does not serve as a guide, empirical 
research is necessary to explore if this change in corporate governance is accompanied by changes in 
bank behavior.  Thus this paper examines Subchapter S banks, as compared to banks of similar size 
in order to determine significant performance differences, including small business lending--an area 
of high asset concentration in small banks.  
We investigate this issue using univariate financial ratio analysis relating primarily to 
earnings, leverage and capital adequacy across the two bank groups.  In addition to financial 
variables in a multivariate framework, we also focus on the bank structure and activity of small 
business lending, an important asset component of small banks.  The majority of banks are under a 
holding company structure. Thus the banking organization at the holding company level is examined 
where appropriate.
3
  Our analysis proceeds with a section establishing our conceptual framework and 
methodology, followed by our data description, and finally, our results.  Overall we find that 
Subchapter S banks do have much stronger financial performance than their counterpart, but have no 
significant differences in small business loan behavior.  Thus, reorganization under this tax loophole, 
appears to have created added value and life to the small bank. 
 
I. Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
A. Univariate Analysis 
A shareholder would be inclined to maintain his investment in a small bank if his returns 
were greater than a substitute investment without incurring greater risk.  Accordingly, through 
univariate analysis, we compare return and risk variables across the two banking groups.  We 
measure increased shareholder value by testing differences in means on specific financial 
performance ratios.  Profitability measures include return on assets and return on equity, before and 
after tax, at both the bank and holding company level.  Dividend payout ratios are also compared as 
well as bank and holding company taxes.  Risk measures include loan quality, debt-to-equity and 
capital adequacy.  These provide some indication of the soundness of the bank’s primary earning 
asset, its leverage exposure, and its capital cushion in the event of losses.  Balance sheet asset ratios 
are also included to test differences in primary and secondary sources of liquidity, as well as 
investment in loans and deposit funding sources.  Bank structure variables, though examined in 
greater detail in relation to small business lending (SBL), are also included in this univariate setting. 
 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
Analysis of SBL is based on multivariate regression analysis under a private information 
versus diversity hypothesis.  That is, small, more simply structured banking organizations may 
experience a comparative advantage in SBL due to their relative ease in obtaining and processing 
private information inherent in this market (Nakamura, 1994).  Conversely larger, more complex  
                                                          
3
  The holding company is not required to be a Subchapter S corporate structure if its member bank(s) is so 
organized.  Nevertheless, most holding companies having Subchapter S member banks are also organized as 
Subchapter S corporations. 
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structured banks may be in a position to take more risk investing in SBL due to their diversity 
advantage (Strahan and Weston, 1998). Furthermore, advanced technologies such as credit scoring 
have strengthened this advantage (Mester, 1997).  Our empirical work, therefore, seeks to explain 
SBL both as a function of the attributes that affect a bank’s ability to process private information, 
and its diversification improving its ability to tolerate risk. Our hypothesis is that larger banks and/or 
those with more complex structures will process private information less well but nonetheless will 
have a greater ability to diversify.  Small, simple banks may be able to better process private 
information, but clearly will not have the relative ability to diversify risk.  Regarding Subchapter S 
banks, we are unclear as to the role of our competing hypotheses. On the one hand, fewer 
shareholders may imply less involvement in the community, thus a smaller private information pool 
dampening SBL.  On the other hand, the improved tax position may generate a greater emphasis on 
the higher earnings in this market (versus investment in less risky assets such as bonds) encouraging 
the building of  long-term customer relationships with small business firms.  Our reduced form 
specification is: 
 
  SBL = f (BANK SIZE,  HOLDING COMPANY ORGANIZATION, EXTENT OF BRANCHING, LOCATION )  
 
The first three sets of variables--bank size, holding company organization and extent of 
branching--capture larger size and complexity of structure, thereby implying greater diversification; 
whereas small size and simplicity of structure imply better private information.   Location of the 
main banking office in urban versus rural markets control for differences in demand and growth.  
The state in which the bank is domiciled is also used in order to control for differences in market and 
operating conditions across state boundaries. Included in our general category of location are 
variables for bank age, to control for performance differences inherent in newly formed banks 
(Goldberg and DeYoung, 1999; Goldberg and White, 1998; Sullivan, 2000).  Bank age also controls 
for length of time to establish a reputation and to gather information in the community.  Additionally, 
a variable measuring the effect of transactional Internet Web sites is part of  location, since this 
technology transcends local market boundaries. 
 
C. Multivariate Dependent SBL Variables 
Our tests use two alternative measures of lending activity to illustrate the extent to which the 
institutional variables described above alter banks’ participation in a market that is presumably bank 
dependent for credit. Since most of these banks have no business loans over $100,000, we use the 
natural log of SBL not exceeding $100,000 as our standard dependent variable [Ln (SBL100)].
4
 
The second measure of SBL activity  in our view presents a clearer test of bank size as a 
determinate in our competing hypotheses.  Small banks may specialize in SBL because capital 
constraints limit these banks’ participation in the large loan market.  The default of a large loan can 
render a small bank insolvent.  Thus in our second measure we put capital constraints aside by  
                                                          
4
  Results for SBL of $1,000,000 and below, the largest small business loan category, are qualitatively the same.  In 
order to avoid undue reporting burdens upon the banks, small businesses are defined by the size of their original loan 
amount, rather than the size of the firm.  Size of the business rather than size of the loan is a preferred measure.  
However, Scanlon (1984) has indicated that original loan size serves as a good proxy for borrower size. 
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disaggregating SBL into the difference between the natural log of small commercial and industrial 
(SCI) loans and small commercial real estate (SCRE) loans  [Ln (SCI/SCRE)].  This  last distinction 
is particularly important, since assessing credit risk may be more difficult in SCI loans as compared 
to SCRE.  Real estate collateral is generally straightforward to appraise, improves loan liquidity, and 
allows for easier assessment of risk exposure.  Under conditions of stable or rising real estate prices 
SCRE loans require less monitoring.   So, real estate may be obtained as collateral perhaps to 
overcome information gaps; whereas SCI loans include unsecured loans, or monitor-intensive loans 
made in some cases solely on the character of the borrower.  Hence, they encompass relationship 
driven credits.  Thus, the more information sensitive subset of small business loans are SCI as 
opposed to SBL secured by commercial real estate.   
 
D. Economies of Scale 
We also test economies of scale by using our multivariate framework  to determine if 
earnings improve across our two banking sectors as the bank or the holding company increases in 
size, while controlling for our remaining structure variables
5
.  Our measures are before tax earnings 
on assets and equity at both the bank and holding company levels.  We use before tax earnings, since 
this is a more realistic measure of profitability across the two banking sectors.  After tax earnings, 
though not reported, produce qualitatively the same results.  However, due to the favorable tax 
treatment of the Subchapter S banks, mean after tax returns are substantially higher. 
 
II. Data Description 
At the holding company level, data for this research are extracted from the Federal Reserve 
Bank Holding Company file.  We use the direct holder, rather than the highest holder of the bank, 
since the direct holder, if different from the highest holder, generally has a much larger percentage of 
ownership.  At the bank level data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s Bank Call 
report file.  Both are as of June 30, 2000, the annual reporting date for SBL.  Holding company and 
bank data are merged into one data set.  For purposes of standardization, the holding company 
unconsolidated parent financial statements are used, since small holding companies submit only 
these types of statement.  Specifically, the statements include balance sheets, income statements and 
changes in equity capital.  Banks with total assets of $100 million and less are used, since average 
assets across the two banking sectors are essentially the same, and are unarguably small banks.
6
   
Banks not having any business lending or which make only large business loans are eliminated.  This 
results in approximately 5100 banks (over half of the total banking population) across the U.S. and 
its protectorates.
7
  We employ a semi-logarithmic OLS model in our multivariate specification.  
Where the OLS regression errors are heteroscedastic (as determined by the White test), we report the 
robust errors as taken from the White heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
Definitions of all the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table I. 
                                                          
5
  Admittedly, the most desirable test for economies of scale is to estimate a long run average cost curve, which 
exceeds the scope of this paper. 
6
  Including all Subchapter S banks involve 41 banks that have assets in excess of $300 million--a size outside of 
small bank parameters.  However, results on this larger sample size are similar. 
7
  Banks having no small business lending are primarily foreign bank branch offices and credit card banks. 
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III. Empirical Results 
Our results indicate significant differences in means of the financial variables across the two 
banking groups, with Subchapter S banks having a stronger performance.  Small business lending 
activity does not differ greatly between the sectors, but as in previous research (Craig and Hardee, 
2000, 2001) evidence weighs more towards the private information hypothesis, though elements of 
diversity do exist.  Economies of scale are experienced as the bank size grow larger, more 
particularly when measured at the bank level versus the holding company level. And, in support of 
the stronger financial performance of the Subchapter S banks, mean earnings are higher at both the 
bank and holding company levels, when controlling for other structural differences.  All of this taken 
together, indicate added shareholder value in the Subchapter S structure, thereby postponing their 
demise in the consolidation process.  The specific findings are presented below. 
 
A. Univariate Analysis 
As reflected in Table II, the Subchapter S banks and holding companies (HC) predictably, show 
much higher dividend payout ratios and lower taxes.
8
  Additionally, these organizations have higher 
earnings than their counterpart.  Profitability measures reflect higher mean earnings with differences 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  Both bank and HC return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) are more favorable in the SubS sector. This is true not only after tax, but before taxes 
(BT) as well.  Net interest margins are also more favorable. 
Risk measures, as captured by leverage in the debt-to-equity ratios, capital adequacy and loan 
quality are more weighted towards SubS banks, though with some differences, primarily in lower 
capital at the bank level.  Capital adequacy, or bank capital as a percentage of assets,  is 1.03% lower 
at SubS banks at the 1% significance level.  Presumably this is attributable to capital expended in 
shareholder buy out to qualify for SubS conversion, as well as lower retained earnings due to higher 
dividend payouts.  However, the ratio of 10.1% for these banks is still ample.  A 10% capital 
adequacy ratio for a small bank is deemed ample by regulatory standards (Harvey and Padget, 2000). 
 While capital adequacy is lower at the bank level, it is significantly higher at the holding company 
level.  Accordingly, debt-to-equity at the bank level is higher for the SubS structure, but is lower at 
the holding company level.   
A final measure of risk is loan quality, as represented by the allowance for loan losses (a 
reserve account) as a percentage of total loans, the provision for loan losses (addition to the reserve 
account) as a percentage of total loans, and net charged off loans as a percentage of total loans.  The 
higher these ratios, the lower the loan quality.  In all three measures, the ratios were lower at SubS 
banks, and the difference statistically significant, implying better credit quality in the loan portfolios.  
                                                          
8
  We expected assets allocated to tax free municipal bonds to be higher at Subchapter S banks, perhaps motivated by 
the bank’s desire to allocate more tax free income to the shareholder.  That is, if a SubS bank is to retain some of its 
earnings to meet capital adequacy requirements, it may withhold its income from municipal bonds, and distribute 
only its taxable income to the shareholders.  Thus the owners do not experience a lower after tax return by being 
taxed on bank earnings on which no cash distribution is received.  Although the mean MUNI/TA ratio is higher at 
SubS banks, it is not statistically significant. 
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In terms of balance sheet structure, cash-to-assets is lower for the SubS sector at both the 
bank and holding company level.  This could be due to the buy out of the smaller shareholders in the 
reorganization process.  However bonds-to-assets, a secondary source of liquidity is significantly 
higher (perhaps to account for lower cash liquidity).  Bank loans-to-assets are about the same across 
the two sectors, indicating equal participation in this higher earning portfolio investment, while 
deposits-to-assets, a cheaper funding source, is higher for the SubS sector.   
Small business lending in lower loan levels is higher in SubS banks.  That is, a higher 
percentage of total assets are devoted to SBL $100,000 and less (SBL100/TA).  As these loans 
become larger, the non SubS banks ratio becomes greater.  Additionally, more informationally 
sensitive C&I lending is done in both small and larger SBL loans in the SubS group. 
In terms of holding company (HC) structure, SubS banks have a more HC organizations than 
their counterpart, with these HCs having much smaller asset size.  They are typically one bank 
holding companies, as opposed to multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) or those holding 
companies domiciled out of state (OUTSIDE BHC).  Ostensibly, the one bank holding company 
eases the burden of converting multiple banks to a SubS organization.  Tiering or layering of HC 
organizations (MULTI-LAYERED) are statistically no different across the two sectors.  No SubS 
banks have holding companies owned by a majority of foreign investors and significantly fewer are 
publicly traded.  
 
SubS banks are located more in rural areas, are longer established relative their counterpart, 
and offer fewer Internet banking capabilities--(although this difference is only about 1%).  SubS 
banks have about as many unit banks (a bit more than half), but if organized as a branch bank, do not 
differ significantly in the average number of branch offices.  
 
B. Multivariate Analysis--SBL 
In the small business lending regression results (Table III), Subchapter S banks, while 
controlling for other structural differences of size, holding company organization, branching and 
market do not reveal statistically significant differences.  Thus, smaller shareholder numbers appear 
not to affect the degree of activity in SBL.  However, as with previous research (Craig and Hardee, 
2000, 1999) the private information hypothesis does appear to dominate, although diversity does 
come through on some variables.  This holds even though our prior research included the entire 
banking population, whereas this sample is limited to smaller sized small banks.
9
  Predictably, as 
banks grow larger (as measured by the natural log of total assets--Ln ta), they do increase their 
investment in SBL.  However, as rural banks grow larger they are participating less in the 
informational sensitive SBL over those secured by real estate, perhaps to overcome informational 
disadvantages.  Banks in a holding company organization have higher investment in SBL over the no 
holding company bank (the omitted dummy variable).  Although this appears to support the diversity 
hypothesis in that these organizations may be more complex, as the holding company grows in size 
(Hclogta), the effect is negative.  Also in support of private information is the negative and 
                                                          
9
  A small bank may be considered to be $300 million or less in asset size.  Thus, this research is confined to the 
smaller subset of small banks. 
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significant outcome on the majority of foreign ownership and publicly traded holding companies.  
Presumably banks with foreign owned holding companies may be more complex and be less inclined 
to be community oriented, thus gathering less private information inherent in SBL.  Additionally, a 
publicly traded holding company adds another layer of complexity.  Foreign owned entities do take 
less commercial real estate as collateral, but it can be argued that the nature of their lending may be 
more biased toward international business and trade, and would fall under the C&I category.  
Notwithstanding, the diversity hypothesis does gain support in that the branch bank dummy variable 
is positive and significant.  However, overall, we feel the private information does outweigh 
diversity, though elements of the latter do exist. 
 
C. Multivariate Analysis--Economies of Scale 
Table IV reflects the dependent variables of before tax bank return on assets (BT--bkroa) and 
return on equity (BT--bkroe)  whereas Table V reflects these same measures at the holding company 
level (BT--HCroa and BT--HCroe).  The right hand side, or bank structure variables are the same as 
in the SBL regressions.  Here, we see that as the banks grow in size, returns to the banks improve as 
well as the holding company, with the exception of BT--HCroe in rural banks.  As the holding 
company grows in size, it makes no difference to bank returns, but yields mixed results to the 
holding company returns--negative and significant in the BT-HCroa regression while positive and 
significant in the BT-HCroe regression.  Since the performance of SubS banks is the main interest in 
this paper, we focus more on the bank returns.  Thus, this rather simplistic measure of economies of 
scale does seem to hold at the bank level.  In addition, on all four regressions, the dummy variable 
for SubS banks is positive and significant, indicating even in a multivariate environment controlling 
for structural differences, the more favorable earnings of these banks hold. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In summary, shareholder value appears to increase in a Subchapter S bank through higher 
earnings, larger dividend payout ratios, and stronger loan quality.  Although capital adequacy is 
lower at the bank level, it remains ample; and is higher at the holding company level.  In terms of 
small business lending as tested via the information versus diversity hypothesis, mixed results are 
obtained.  On balance private information dominates diversity, with no major differences between 
SubS banks and their counterpart under the two hypotheses.  Thus, smaller, more simply structured 
banks appear to have a comparative advantage in small business lending, even when the sample is 
relegated to smaller-sized small banks.  Taken as a whole, the stronger financial performance of 
SubS banks coupled with similar participation in SBL relative to their counterpart, bodes well for 
these institutions.  Therefore, implications of this research are that many smaller banks are likely to 
survive the consolidation process over the long run, given the Subchapter S tax advantage remains a 
legislative option. 
  
61 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Berger A. N. and G. F. Udell, 1995, “Universal Banking and the future of small business lending”, 
paper in the Finance and Economic Discussion Series, number 95-21, Division of Research 
and Statistics, Division of Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., May. 
 
Craig, Steven G. and Polly Hardee, 2000, “The Impact of Bank Structure on Small Business and 
Farm Lending”, Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, 6, 59-83. 
 
Craig, Steven G. and Polly Hardee, 2001, “The Internet, Bank Structure and Small Business 
Lending”, Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Vol 1, Issue 1, pp.77-96. 
 
DeYoung, Robert, 1999, “Birth, Growth, and Life or Death of Newly Chartered Banks”, Federal 
 Reserve Bank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives, Third Quarter,  pp. 18-35. 
 
Jayaratne, J. and John Wolken ,1999, “How important are small banks to small business lending?  
New evidence from a survey of small firms”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 23, Feb., pp 
427-459. 
 
Goldberg, L.G. and L. J. White, 1998, “De nova banks and lending to small businesses: an empirical 
analysis”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, August, pp.851-867. 
 
___________and R. DeYoung 1999, “Youth, adolescence and maturity at banks: Credit availability 
 to small businesses in an era of banking and consolidation”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 
 23, Feb., pp.463-492. 
 
Harvey, James and Jane Padget, 2000, “Subchapter S--A New Tool for Enhancing the Value of 
Community Banks”, Financial Industry Perspectives, Dec., pp.17-25. 
 
Keeton, W. R., 1995, “Multi-office bank lending to small businesses:  Some New Evidence”, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, (second quarter). 
 
Keeton, W. R., 1996, “Do bank mergers reduce lending to businesses and farmers?  New evidence 
from Tenth District states”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, (3rd). 
 
Mester, L., 1997, “What’s the point of credit scoring?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
Business Review, Sept/Oct., pp. 3 - 16. 
 
Nakamura, L. I., 1994, “Small borrowers and the survival of the small bank:  Is mouse bank Mighty 
or Mickey?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review,  Nov-Dec., pp. 3 - 16. 
  
62 
 
Scanlon, M., 1984, “Relationship between commercial bank size and size of borrower”, Small 
Business Finance, Horvitz, Paul M., and R. Richardson Pettit, eds., JAI Press, inc. 
Greenwich, Connecticut; London, England. 
 
Strahan, Phillip E. and Weston, James P. 1998, “Small business lending and the changing structure 
of the banking industry”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 22, August, pp.821-845. 
 
Sullivan, Richard J., 2000, “How has the adoption of Internet Banking affected performance and risk 
in banks?”, Financial Industry Perspectives, Dec., pp.1-16. 
 
 
 
 
  
53 
 
TABLE I 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
RHS VARIABLES 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Size Variable 
 
 
 
Ln ta 
 
the natural log of the bank’s total assets 
 
Ln ta Urban 
 
the natural log of the bank’s total assets interacted with an 
urban dummy variable 
 
Holding Company 
Variables 
 
The omitted variable is unaffiliated banks--i.e., banks 
without any holding company structure, or “No-Holding-
Company-Banks” 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a single bank holding 
company domiciled in the same state as the member bank 
 
Instate-mbhc 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a multibank holding 
company domiciled within the state of the member bank 
 
Outside bhc 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a bank holding 
company located outside the state of  the member bank 
 
HClogta 
 
the natural log of (total assets of the highest holding 
company less the equity share*bank’s assets)  
 
Multilayer 
 
a dummy variable for a tiering relationship in a bank 
holding companyB multiple holding company levels   
 
Publicly traded 
 
a dummy variable a bank holding company whose equity 
shares are publically traded in the capital markets.  
 
Majforeign 
 
a dummy variable for over 50% foreign ownership at the 
holding company or bank level   
 
Branching 
Variables 
 
For the dummy variable, unit banks (banks having no 
branches) is the omitted variable 
 
Branchbank 
 
a dummy variable if the bank has at least one banking office 
in addition to its main location. 
 
Ln office number 
 
the natural log of number of branches of a particular bank 
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TABLE I (CONT.) 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
RHS VARIABLES 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Location, Age 
 
 
 
Urban 
 
a dummy variable equaling one for an urban location of the 
main office of the bank, zero otherwise 
 
Lnbankage 
 
the natural log of the time in years since the bank was 
chartered 
 
LnbankageUrban 
 
the natural log of the time in years since the bank was 
chartered interacted with an urban dummy variable 
 
INET Bank 
 
a dummy variable equaling one for banks having 
transactional internet web site, zero otherwise 
 
SubS Bank 
 
a dummy variable equaling one for banks classed as a 
Subchapter S corporation, zero otherwise 
 
  
55 
 
TABLE II 
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
 
 
Variable  
 
MeanBSub S Bank 
N=1077 
 
MeanBNon Sub S Bank 
N=4041 
 
Difference of Means 
 
BANK SIZE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Assets (Mill.) 
 
47,876 
 
47,550 
 
 326.8 
 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
 
 
54.07% 
 
 
15.94% 
 
 
38.03%*** 
 
TAXES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank TAXES (000's)  
 
18.981 
 
97.160 
 
-78.179*** 
 
Taxes/TA--Bank  
 
0.04% 
 
0.18% 
 
-0.14%*** 
 
HC TAXES (000's) 
 
14.045 
 
904.85 
 
-890.81*** 
 
Taxes/Equity--HC 
 
0.07% 
 
0.36% 
 
-0.29%*** 
 
Bank MUNIS/TA 
 
4.48% 
 
4.27% 
 
0.21% 
 
PROFITABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank ROA 
 
0.79% 
 
0.36% 
 
0.43%*** 
 
Bank ROA--BT 
 
0.83% 
 
0.54% 
 
0.29%*** 
 
HC ROA 
 
7.90% 
 
4.20% 
 
3.70%*** 
 
HC ROA--BT 
 
7.21% 
 
3.31% 
 
3.90%*** 
 
Bank ROE 
 
8.52% 
 
4.00% 
 
4.52%*** 
 
Bank ROE--BT 
 
8.95% 
 
5.88% 
 
3.07%*** 
 
HC ROE 
 
8.62% 
 
4.43% 
 
4.19%*** 
 
HC ROE--BT 
 
8.69% 
 
4.79% 
 
3.90%*** 
 
NET INTEREST 
MARGINS (NIM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank NIM/TA 
 
2.09%  
 
2.02% 
 
0.07%*** 
 
Bank NIM/Equity 
 
22.35% 
 
19.95% 
 
2.40%*** 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE II (CONT.) 
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
 
 
Variable 
 
MeanBSub S Bank 
N=1077 
 
MeanBNon Sub S Bank 
N=4041 
 
Difference of Means 
 
DEBT/EQUITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank D/E 
 
55.06%  
 
47.07% 
 
7.99%*** 
 
HC  D/E 
 
7.59% 
 
9.53% 
 
-1.94%*** 
 
LOAN QUALITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allowance for 
Losses/Loans 
 
1.41% 
 
1.51% 
 
0.10%*** 
 
Provision for 
Losses/Loans 
 
0.14% 
 
0.22% 
 
0.08%*** 
 
Actual Losses/Loans 
 
0.07% 
 
0.11% 
 
0.04%** 
 
BALANCE SHEET  
STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Cash/TA 
 
4.81% 
 
 5.13% 
 
-0.32%** 
 
HC Cash/TA 
 
1.94% 
 
2.25% 
 
-0.31%* 
 
Bank BONDS/TA 
 
28.37% 
 
26.23% 
 
2.14%*** 
 
Bank LOANS/TA 
 
59.86% 
 
60.03% 
 
-0.17% 
 
 DEPOSITS/TA 
 
84.65% 
 
83.48% 
 
1.17%*** 
 
Bank CAPITAL/TA 
 
10.59% 
 
12.00% 
 
-1.41%*** 
 
HC CAPITAL/TA 
 
76.37% 
 
63.08% 
 
13.29%*** 
 
SBL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SBL100/TA 
 
10.23% 
 
9.11% 
 
1.12%*** 
 
SBL1MILL/TA 
 
16.73% 
 
17.77% 
 
-1.04%*** 
 
(SCI-SCRE/TA) 
$100,000 or less 
 
3.09% 
 
2.69% 
 
0.40%*** 
 
(SCI-SCRE/TA) 
$1 million or less 
 
2.39% 
 
1.34% 
 
1.05%*** 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE II (CONT.) 
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS 
All banks with Ta’s <=100,000,000 and SBL>0 
 
 
Variable 
 
MeanBSub S Bank 
N=1077 
 
MeanBNon Sub S 
Bank 
N=4041 
 
Difference of Means 
 
HC STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HC Total Assets 
 
37,048 
 
308,240 
 
-271,192** 
 
BHC BANK 
 
82.92% 
 
68.99% 
 
12.93%*** 
 
ONE BANK HC 
 
63.33% 
 
45.43% 
 
17.90%*** 
 
IN STATE MBHC 
 
17.27% 
 
19.40% 
 
-2.13%*** 
 
OUTSIDE BHC 
 
3.15% 
 
4.73% 
 
-1.58%*** 
 
MULTI-LAYERED  
 
13.18% 
 
11.48% 
 
1.70% 
 
FOREIGN OWNED  
 
0.00% 
 
0.47% 
 
-0.53%** 
 
PUBLICLY 
TRADED 
 
7.52% 
 
11.16% 
 
-3.54%*** 
 
BRANCHING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRANCH BANK 
 
53.02% 
 
52.34% 
 
0.68% 
 
OFFICE NUMBER 
 
1.90 
 
2.00 
 
-0.10 
 
URBAN 
 
26.37% 
 
36.15% 
 
-9.78%*** 
 
BANK AGE 
 
72.90 
 
62.18 
 
10.72*** 
 
INTERNET BANK 
 
4.08% 
 
5.15% 
 
-1.07% 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
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TABLE III 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
NATURAL LOG OF SBL 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Ln SBL100  
N=5118      R5=.448 
 
Ln(SCI100/    
SCRE100) 
 
N=5118       
R
2
= .178 
 
=========== 
 
 
 
                               
 
 
 
Independent 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
 
Name 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
=========== 
 
===== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
Intercept 
 
-2.9586*** 
 
0.3495 
 
4.6949*** 
 
0.6615 
 
 SIZE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln ta 
 
1.0250*** 
 
0.0332 
 
-0.32361*** 
 
0.0634 
 
Ln ta--urban
10
 
 
0.9507*** 
 
0.0566 
 
0.0723 
 
0.1047 
 
 HOLDING CO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
1.1364*** 
 
0.1654 
 
0.1628 
 
0.3446 
 
Instate-mbhc 
 
1.2181*** 
 
0.1920 
 
0.0440 
 
0.4004 
 
Outside-bhc 
 
1.0759*** 
 
0.2039 
 
0.0383 
 
0.4303 
 
HClogta 
 
-0.1120*** 
 
0.0197 
 
-0.0113 
 
0.0406 
 
Multilayer 
 
0.0609 
 
0.0407 
 
-0.0206 
 
0.0769 
 
Majority foreign 
 
-1.1398*** 
 
0.2891 
 
2.2614*** 
 
0.7045 
 
Publicly traded 
 
-0.1534*** 
 
0.0493 
 
0.1097 
 
0.0809 
 
 BRANCHING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branchbank 
 
0.1776*** 
 
0.0498 
 
0.0121 
 
0.1047 
 
Ln office number 
 
0.0246 
 
0.0475 
 
-0.0197 
 
0.0985 
 
 LOCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 
0.2622 
 
0.6179 
 
-3.06477*** 
 
1.1141 
 
Lnbankage 
 
-0.0052 
 
0.0148 
 
-0.1033*** 
 
0.0264 
 
LnbankageUrban 
 
0.1077*** 
 
0.0207 
 
-0.3072*** 
 
0.0380 
 
INET Bank 
 
-0.0195 
 
0.0613 
 
0.17431 
 
0.1118 
 
SubS Bank 
 
0.0383 
 
0.0280 
 
-0.08514 
 
0.0567 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported. 
                                                          
10
This variable is the interaction of Ln ta and urban.  Thus, Ln ta represents size for rural banks, and this variable 
size for urban banks.  The reported coefficient is the sum of the actual coefficients on the Ln ta variable and the 
interaction variable from the original regression.  The robust errors have been adjusted to equal (VarianceLnta + 
VarianceLn ta urban +2*Covariance)
2 .  The remaining interaction variable has not been adjusted and is reported as the 
original regression. 
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TABLE IV 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
Bank ROA & ROE, Before Tax 
 
 
DependentVariable 
 
BT-bkroa          
    
 
  
 
BT-bkroe 
 
  
 
 
 
N=5112 
R5=.449 
 
 
 
N=5112 
R5=.146 
 
 
 
Independent 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
 
Name 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
=========== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.0173*** 
 
0.0042 
 
-0.2457*** 
 
0.0773 
 
 SIZE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln ta 
 
0.0016*** 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0250*** 
 
0.0070 
 
Ln ta--urban
11
 
 
0.0049*** 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0243*** 
 
0.0076 
 
 HOLDING CO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
-0.0041 
 
0.0037 
 
0.1264 
 
0.0910 
 
Instate-mbhc 
 
-0.0037 
 
0.0043 
 
0.1578 
 
0.1078 
 
Outside-bhc 
 
-0.0048 
 
0.0043 
 
0.1434 
 
0.1063 
 
HClogta 
 
0.0005 
 
0.0004 
 
-0.0137 
 
0.0110 
 
Multilayer 
 
-0.0007** 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0049 
 
0.0062 
 
Majority foreign 
 
0.0012 
 
0.0032 
 
-0.0382 
 
0.0277 
 
Publicly traded 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0050 
 
0.0063 
 
 BRANCHING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branchbank 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0076* 
 
0.0046 
 
Ln office number 
 
-0.0019*** 
 
0.0004 
 
-0.0070 
 
0.0054 
 
 LOCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 
-0.0380*** 
 
0.0064 
 
-0.0126 
 
0.0800 
 
Lnbankage 
 
0.0025*** 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0113*** 
 
0.0011 
 
LnbankageUrban 
 
0.0007** 
 
0.0003 
 
0.0058*** 
 
0.0016 
 
INET Bank 
 
-0.0014** 
 
0.0006 
 
-0.0145*** 
 
0.0048 
 
SubS Bank 
 
0.0013*** 
 
0.0002 
 
0.0176*** 
 
0.0030 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported. 
                                                          
11
  This variable is the interaction of Ln ta and urban.  Thus, Ln ta represents size for rural banks, and this variable 
size for urban banks.  The reported coefficient is the sum of the actual coefficients on the Ln ta variable and the 
interaction variable from the original regression.  The robust errors have been adjusted to equal (VarianceLnta + 
VarianceLn ta urban +2*Covariance)
2 .  The remaining interaction variable has not been adjusted and is reported as the 
original regression. 
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TABLE V 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS 
Holding Company ROA & ROE, Before Tax 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
BT-HCroa     
N=3672        
 
  
 
BT-HCroe    
 N=3672 
 
  
 
 
 
R5=.282 
 
 
 
R5=.032 
 
 
 
Independent 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
All Banks 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Robust 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
 
Name 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
Estimate 
 
Error 
 
=========== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
====== 
 
Intercept 
 
0.0124 
 
0.0170 
 
0.0511 
 
0.0624 
 
 SIZE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ln ta 
 
0.0063*** 
 
0.0022 
 
-0.0116* 
 
0.0068 
 
Ln ta--urban 
 
0.0103*** 
 
0.0028 
 
0.0221** 
 
0.0106 
 
 HOLDING CO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
0.0111*** 
 
0.0023 
 
-0.0060 
 
0.0084 
 
Instate-mbhc 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
Outside-bhc 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0028 
 
-0.0036 
 
0.0127 
 
HClogta 
 
-0.0058*** 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0129*** 
 
0.0038 
 
Multilayer 
 
0.0058*** 
 
0.0024 
 
0.0007 
 
0.0084 
 
Majority foreign 
 
-0.0039 
 
0.0087 
 
-0.0130 
 
0.0589 
 
Publicly traded 
 
-0.0007 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0023 
 
0.0088 
 
 BRANCHING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branchbank 
 
-0.0005 
 
0.0026 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0113 
 
Ln office number 
 
0.0004 
 
0.0025 
 
-0.0009 
 
0.0103 
 
 LOCATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 
-0.1366*** 
 
0.0284 
 
-0.2601** 
 
0.1125 
 
Lnbankage 
 
0.0042*** 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0056* 
 
0.0034 
 
LnbankageUrban 
 
0.0061*** 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0072 
 
0.0043 
 
INET Bank 
 
-0.0110*** 
 
0.0040 
 
-0.0095 
 
0.0128 
 
SubS Bank 
 
0.0317*** 
 
0.0017 
 
0.0391*** 
 
0.0064 
 
***  Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level. 
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported. 
